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APPEAL-SERVING "CASE '-CITY OF GARDEN CITY V. MERCHANTS' AND
FAImERS' NATIONAL BANK OF DANSVILLE, N. Y., 6o Fed. (Kan.) 823.-The
records of the lower court show that after the judgment had been rendered
the court extended the time of the defendant for making and serving a case
to the 22d day of March, 1897. On the 22d further extension was made.
Defendant claims that the case made was not served within the time fixed by
order of the lower court. Held, that a time for serving such "case" expired
March 21, at midnight, and a case served under an order made March 22
would not be served in time.
In King v. Stevens &-, Agnew, 5 East 244, Lord Ellenborough said -- that
the words ' to and until' may be either inclusive or exclusive, according to the
manifest intention of the persons using them." The cases of Afontgomery v.
Reed, 69. Me. 514; Thomas v. Hatch, 3 Sumn. 178, 179, and De Haven v. De
Haven, 49 Ind. 2g6, hold that the word "to" is exclusive, while Gottleib v.
The Fred. W. Wolf CO., 75 Md. 126, a case in many respects parallel to the
present case, holds that the word "to" is inclusive. In the cases of Bellhouse
v. Miller, 4 Hurl. & Nor. 12o; Isaac v. Royal Ins. Co. L. R., 5 Exch. 296.
and Thomas v. Douglas, 2 Johns Cases 225, hold that the word "until," which
is synonomous with "to," is inclusive.
ARREsT-JusTiFIcATIoN-FALsE IMPRISONMENT-SNEAD v. Bo.,.\OrL, 63 N.
Y. Sup. 553.-Officers, suspecting felony, made an arrest without a warrant
and found a concealed weapon in possession of the party, for which misde-
meanor he was subsequently fined. Failing to get proof of felony, they
charged the plaintiff with carrying concealed weapon after he had been in jail
24 hours beyond the time when he was entitled to discharge upon bail, had
they made such charge at once. Held, false imprisonment. Van Brunt, P. J.,
and Ingraham, J., dissenting.
As to justification for arrest in that a concealed weapon was found, the
majority opinion follows Jfur6hy v. Kron, 8 N. Y. St.-R. 230. "You cannot
arrest a man merely because, if all were known, he would be arrestable."
Even admitting justification, they held that, owing to the said 24 hours' over-
time, the case was within the rule laid down in the Six Carinters' Case. 8
Coke 146, thus deeming the officers trespassers ab initio. The dissentingjudges held that the detention was not wholly illegal and that an arrest made
by an officer without a warrant for a misdemeanor committed in his presence is
not a false imprisonment. 12 Am and Eng. Ency. 726, 740; M~eser-e v.
Folsom, 2o AUt. 926. They contended also that it was against public policy
thus to hamper the police m the exercise of their discretion.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-LIEN-WEATHERFORD V. HILL rr AL., 56 S. W.
Rep. 448.-Claim for attorney's lien on land assigned as dower. Held, where
attorney obtains partition of land he acquires no lien for his fees on the part
set aside for his client. Bunn, C. J., dissenting.
This ruling is in strict conformity with the decisions contained in Hershey
v. Deo. Val., 47 Ark. 86; Gilson v. Buckner, 44 S. W. io34. Nevertheless, m
Brown v. Biddle, 3 Tenn. CIL 618; Wilson v. Wrght, 72 Ga. 848, the lien
was recognized. It was also extended in England by 23 and 24 N-ict., ch. 127
and 128.
BLLs A) NoTEs -IRREGULAR INDORSEMENT- CARRINGTON V. ODOM, 27
Son. Rep. 5io (Ala.).-Where defendant endorsed a promissory note before
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delivery. Held, he is subjected to only the obligations of an endorsee, unless
it is shown by oral evidence (which is held admissible) that he executed it as
maker.
The authorities are hopelessly at variance on the question of anomalousindorsements; some courts holding such an endorser a joint promisor or surety.
McGuire v. Bosworth. I La Ann 248. Pennsylvania regarding liens as aguarantor. Schollenberoer v. Nell, 28 Pa. St. 189. The Connecticut courtholds in Perkins v. Cat2zn, ii Conn. 213, that the nature of the indorsementis to be proved by oral evidence, while in Wr iglt v. Morse, 9 Gray 337, thepresumption that he intended to be an originaf promisor seems to be conclu-
sive. The difficulty of carrying out the intention of the parties and at the
same time preserving the certainty and exactness of commercial instruments,
possibly accounts for the conflict among the courts.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-BANKRUPTCY-ALMONYBARCLAY V. BARCLAY, 56
N. E. 636.-Plaintiff in error brings record to the Supreme Court claiming
that proceedings, resulting in a decree of alimony, should have been stayed in
Circuit Court until adjudication on a bankruptcy petition, and also claiming
that Section 12 of Article II of the Constitution: "No person shall be impris-
oned for debt, etc.," has been violated. Held, that there was no error com-
mitted by the Circuit Court.
The question as to whether alimony is a "debt" within the meaning of a
statute providing for relief from such debts by a discharge in bankruptcy,
seems to be undecided. A decree for alimony and costs is a provable debt un-der Bankrupt Act of z898. In re Van Orden, 96 Fed. 86. Alimony is not adebt. Noyes v. Hubbard, i5 L. R. A. 39 Nor is it a .debt" within the con-
stitutional inhibition of imprisonment for debt, and the defendant may be held
to answer for contempt in default of payment. Pain v. Pain. 8o N. Car. 322;Chase v. Ingalls, 97 Mass. 524. Failure to pay alimony as directed by order
of court is no ground for imprisonment. Wighttman v. Wightman, 45 Ill.167; Steller v. Steller, 25 Mich. 159.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DENTISTRY-EXAMINATIONS-KNOWLES v. STATE, 45
Atlan. 877 (Md.).-By a legislative act all persons wishing to practice dentistry
in M [aryland were required to pass an, examination given by a State board of
.examiners. By a clause in the act the board was allowed to waive the exami-
nation at its discretion. Held, that such an act was constitutional.
As to the constitutional right of a State to require examinations of thiskind there can be no doubt. Dent v. W. Va., 129 N. S. 114; Singer v. State,72 Ind. 464. The point of controversy in the case was whether the right to
waive the examination by the board was not conferring upon it unreasonable
and arbitrary power, thus making it come under the decision as laid downin Yiek Wo v. Hofikins, 118 U. S. 356. The court reached its decision on theidea that the spirit and principle upon which the act was passed precluded anylimit of purely personal and arbitrary power. Williams v. State Board, 93Penn. 619; State v. Creditor, 44 Kan. 568.
CORPORATIONS-PROMOTERs-ATToRNEY AND CLIENT-FREEMAN IMP. CO. v.
OSBORN, 6o Pac. Rep. 730 (Colo.).-Where an attorney rendered services to the
promoter of a corporation, drawing articles of association, by-laws, etc. Held,
the charge is an indebtedness of the corporation when it comes into existence.
Bell's Gas Co. v. Christie, 79 Pa. St. 54; Law v. Connecticut, etc., Ry. CO., 45
N. H. 370. Contra, Gent v. Manufacturer's Ins. Co., 107 I1. 652.
CORPORATE STOcK-DAMAGES-EVIDENCE-MARKET QUOTATIONS-SALES-
WILDES XT AL v. ROBINSON, 63 N. Y. Sup. 811 (App. Div.).-In an action to
recover damages for failure to deliver stock according to contract, evidence as.
to market quotations on said stock at a certain time was admitted to show its
value. Held, inadmissible unless based on actual sales. New trial ordered.
O Brien and Ingrahm, J. J., dissenting.
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The court held that a mere bid in a distant market, without proof of
attending circumstances, is not competent evidence as to value of the property
in question. Whitney v. Thacher, 117 Mass. 527; Hanna v. Sanford, 20 W.
Dig. 288. The proper measure of damages was the difference between the
price agreed to be paid and the market value of the stock at the contracted
date of delivery. Interest is sometimes added. Gibbous v. U. S., 8 Wall 269;
5 Am. &-Eng.-Ency. 630. The dissenting judges held that in absence of other
evidence a reference to a distant market is justified. Gregory v. AfcDowal,
8 Wend. 435; Durst v. Burton, 47 N. Y. 167. They also contended that a
bid is a fair basis of estimation, as it is generally below actual value.
DIVORCE-CRuELTY-HAIGHT v. HAIGHT, 82 N. W. 443 (Iowa).-Held,
frequent and false charges of adultery made against a wife by her husband
constitute cruelty for which a divorce may be granted.
The earlier courts were loath to consider this sufficient ground. False
charges of adultery and obscene epithets do not constitute cruelty sufficient for
the granting of a divorce. Slaw v. Slzaw, 17 Ct. i89; Harding v. Hardin",
22 Md. 337. There has been a tendency to change, and now a false and mali-
cious charge of adultery is generally held sufficient cruelty. Am. Eng. Ency.
of Law (2d ed.), 9-797, and cases cited there.
DIVORCE-DEATH OF PARTY-BEGBIE V. BEGBxE, 60 Pac. Rep. (Cal.) 667.-
Where defendant in a divorce proceeding died after the rendering of a decree
of divorce in the trial court and before a hearing in the appellate court (an
appeal having been granted). Held, the action abated, and the relation of
husband and wife with the property rights incident thereto was severed, and
no review could be had. Kirchner v. Dietrich, IIO Cal. 502; Barney v. Bar-
ney, 14 Ia. 189. But see Donner v. Howard, 44 Wis. 82, which intimates that
upon death of either party pending an appeal from a judgment granting a
divorce, the appeal would be reviewed for purpose of protecting persons
whose property interests were affected by the judgment.
ELECTRIciTY-AcTIoN FOR CAUSING DEATH-FAILURE TO INsULATE WxEs
-THOMAs, ADMixISTRATOR, V. MARYSVILLE GAS Co., 56 S. W. x53 (Ky.).-The
defendant supplied the wires of a street railway company with electricity.
The railway company failed to properly insulate itswires, thus causing death
of plaintiff's intestate. Held, the Gas Company could be held liable for dam-
ages. Buchanan and DuRella, J. J., dissenting.
This is one of the first cases in which this exact question has been decided.
It would seem on principle that where an article was delivered to the vendee
he would be liable for damages resulting from it. Dixon v. Yales, 2 Nev. &
M1. 202; Foster v. Roafer. I I Mass. io. A person handling dangerous sub-
stances, however, does so at his peril. Whart. Neg. 85I, and thus the
defendant in handling so dangerous a force as electricity, the nature of which
is so little understood by the public, should have used more than ordinary care
in seeing that the wires which they charged for the Railway Company were
properly protected. McLaughlin v. Electric Ltg'htCo., Ioo Ky. 178.
ExcEssrVm SENTENCE-HABEAS CORPuS-DE BARA V. U. S., 99 Fed. Rep.
9 42.-Held, upon habeas corpus proceedings, a sentence for a longer term
than allowed by law was void only as to the excess, and discharge was refused.
There are two rules, one considering the excessive sentence as an entirety and
wholly void; the other holding only the excess void. The former was held in
Ex liarte Kelly, 6s Cal. 154; Exftarte Page, 49, Mo. 291; and Erfiarte Ber-
nert, 7 Pac. C. L. 1. 460; the latter obtains in Alabama, Georgia, Kansas,
Maine, Massachusetts, New York, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Virginia, and
the Federal Courts. Sennott's Case 146 Mass. 489, In re Graham, 74 Wis.
450; Peofile v. Baker, 89 N. Y. 46o, and Ex fiarte, Max., 44 Cal 579.
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FERRIES-ESTABLISHMENT BY A COMBINATION OF PERSONS FOR THEIR OWN
BENEFIT-TANNER V. WARREN, 56 S. W. 167 Ky. i.-A number of persons com-
bined and bought a boat for the convenience of themselves and their families
in crossing a stream within the prohibited distance of an exclusive ferry priv-
ilege. Held, that there was a violation of the privilege, and an injunction
would lie. Du Rella, J., dissenting.
It is difficult to see just where the courts draw the line as to what will
constitute an infringement of a ferry privilege. The cases show that it
is no infringement for a person to transport his own property in his own
boat. Alexandria, etc., Ferry Co. v. Wisch, 73 Mo. 655; Trent v. Car-
tersville Bridge Co., ii Leigh (Va.) 521. One case, at least, hold that
this right may be even extended to the transporting of employees, guests and
friends. Hunter v. Moore, 44 Ark. 184. In the case stated the combination for
the express purpose of avoiding the ferriage was undoubtedly the ground upon
which the decision was based.
FIRE INSURANCE-CONTRACTPOLICY-DELIVERY-PROOF OF Loss-WAIVER
-HICKS V. BRITISH AMERICA AssuR. Co., 56 N. E. 743 (N. Y.).-A plaintiff's
assignor had a conversation with defendant's local agent, and made a contract
of present insurance for $2,500 upon his property. Two days later said prop-
erty was destroyed by fire, and before the standard policy was received.
When notified of the loss, defendant's agent denied that a verbal contract was
made, but the agreement was conclusively proved in court. Plaintiff suing on
breach of contract, defendant holds that the verbal contract embraced the
conditions of the standard policy of fire insurance, which states that a proof
of loss must be shown within sixty days after the fire. Plaintiff admits that
he neglected to do this, but claims that the suit being for breach of contract,
such proof of loss is immaterial. Held, the failure of defendant's agent to issue
a standard policy and his denial of the contract was not a waiver of defend-
ant's right to the provisions of the policy requiring a proof of loss. Landon,
Werner and Haight, J. J., dissenting.
In the cases of Angell v. Insurance Co., 59 N. Y. 171, and Ellis v. In.
surance Co., 50 (N. Y.) 4o2, it was held that an agent had authority to make a
verbal contract of insurance and that "recovery of the amount to be insured is
proper, as damages for the breach of such contract." The court overrules these
decisions on the ground that they were made before the Legislature had pre-
scribed a standard policy of fire insurance in the State.
Judge Werner, in his dissenting opinion, contends that since the agent
denied the verbal contract, plaintiff could regard it as rescinded and sue for
breach. Stokes v. Mackay, 41 N. E. 496.
GROWING CROPS-ATTACHING CREDITORS-CASE ON SHARES-CURTNER V.
SYNDow. 6o PAC. REP. (Cal.) 462-Where rent for leased land was to be paid
in a proportion of the crops, and the lessor assigned his interest in the growing
crops to a third person. Held, as to the assignor's attaching creditors, the
growing crops were personal property and title passed to assignee.
Much conflict of authority exists respecting the question of growing crops.
Tiedeman Real Prop. § 2oi holds the lessor in a cropping contract has no
vested interest in the crop. as such; his title vesting only after apportionment
and delivery, to the same effect. Aihen v. Smith, 21 Vt. 181; Pickens v. Webs-
ter, 3 La. Ann. 870, holds the uncut crops under such an agreement subject to
the lessee's creditors; also does Ho ward Co. v. Kyte, 28 N. W. Rep. (Ia.) 6o9,
and Long v. Leavers. 1o3 Pa. St. 517. In support of the present case see Pole
v. Hurtle, x4 Cal. 403.
HABEAS CORPUS-EXTRADrTIO.-TREATY STIPULATIONS-COHN V. JONES, 100.
Fed. Rep. 639.-Plaintiff was extradited from Canada upon an information
charging arson for the burning of a house, further described as in the occupa-
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tion of a shoe company. In the treaty it was stipulated that there should be
-no liability for any but the offense surrendered for. The alleged house was in
fact a store, the burning of which was statutory arson in Iowa, but not arson
at all in Canada. Held, the action of the Canadian authorities in giving over
the prisoner was conclusive and habeas corpus was refused.
INDIANS-CAPACITY TO SUE-EJECTMENT-JOHNSON V. LONG ISLAND R. Co.,
56 N. E. 992.(N. Y.).-Plaintiff, a member of the Montauk tribe of Indians,
brought action in ejectment on behalf of himself and any members of the tribe
who would come in and contribute to the expense. Held, that Indian tribes
are wards of the State and generally speaking are possessed of only such
rights to appear and litigate in courts of justice as are conferred on them by
statue, Vann and Landon, J. J., dissent.
Where the jurisdiction depends on the subject matter of the controversy
and not upon the status of the parties, the weight of authority seems to favor
the right of an Indian to a standing in both the United States courts and the
State courts. Wiley v. Keokuk. 6 Kan. 94; Yick Wo v. Hofikins, xis U. S.
356; .Dred Scott v. Sandford, ig How. (U. S.) 403.
INTERNAL REVENUE-STAMP TAx-BONDS OF SALOON K'EEPERS-UNITED
STATES V OWENS, District Court, E. D, Missouri, Fed. Rep. i6o, Page 17o.-
The question presented by the demurrer to the information in this case is
whether a dramshop keeper's bond, given pursuant to the provisions of the
State of Missouri, is subject to the stamp tax of 5o cents' imposed by the war
revenue act of x898 (Inter Alia) upon all "Bonds of any description, except
such as may be required in legal proceedings not otherwise provided for in
this section."
Held, that a bond given by a saloon keeper, as one of the conditions of
the granting by the State of a license, is an instrumentality employed by the
State to execute and enforce its own laws in the exercise of its police powers,
and does not require an internal revenue stamp, under the war revenue act of
1898. The most notable point in this case isthe fact that the Court construes
the bond as a part of the license. It is a well established rule that the license
itself is exempt from the stamp tax. The court maintains that the licensi
does not express the entire contract between the State and saloon keeper; but
that the bond and license taken together, constitute the contract or license,
therefore, as part of the license, is not liable to be taxed.
. JUDGMENT-BAR-LIBEL AND SLANDER-CoRPORATIONS-UNI ON AssocL.TED
PRESS v. HEATH. 63 N. Y. Supp. 96.-The Associated Press had published a
libel on the Union Associated Press by sending it to iti correspondents. For
that publication a recovery was had against the Associated Press by the Union
Associated Press. The defendant in this case was a publisher to whom the
Associated Press had sent the libel, and he had republished it. Held. that the
judgment against the Associated Press was no bar to a recovery against him.
Van Brunt, P. J., and McLaughlin, J., dissenting.
Though the libel be the same, yet a different publication will give another
cause of action. Every publication must be regarded as a new and distinct
injury. WVood v. Pangburn. 75 N. Y. 498. A recovery for the wrong by the
first publisher of a libel is not a satisfaction for the second publication. Wood
v. Pangburn (supra).' The dissenting justices maintain that the recovery
against the Associated Press precludes further recovery from other publishers,
as the act of sending the article, and the actual publication of it by the recip-
ient, constitute a simple wrong, for which one recovery would be a complete
satisfaction as to all. Knae, v. Roche, 94 N. Y. 329; Lord v. Yi4fany, 9S N.
Y. 412. The prevailing opinion seems supported by the greater weight of
zauthority.
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LANDOWNER'S PROPERTY IN SUBTERRANEAN OILS AND GAS-OHIO OIL Co. V.
STATE OF INDIANA, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 576.-A statute was passed by the Legisla-
ture of Indiana restricting the waste of oil and gas by the owner of the soil.
Held, constitutional and not an interference with the rights of private prop-
erty.
In the present case subterranean streams are held to be of the nature ofthings ferae naturae, and that property therein is not obtained until a reduc-
tion to possession takes place by a confining in vaults, vats or other appropriate
receptacle. See Comment.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-ABANDONMENT OF PREMISES-RELETTING--GRAY V.
KAUFMAN DAIRY AND ICE CREAm Co., 56 N. E. 9o3 (N. Y.).-Action to recover
two months' rent of plaintiff's premises. Defendant abandoned leased prem-
ises of plaintiff, who then wrote to the defendant, refusing to accept his offer
to surrender, stating that he would relet premises on his account and hold
him responsible for any loss. Defendant did not reply, and an interview was
held, and an offer of compromise was made. Said plaintiff wrote defendant
that he had an offer for premises at a lower rental, and asked him if he would
make good the difference. Not receiving a reply he relet, in his own name, to
new tenant. Held, that the acts of the plaintiff operated as an acceptance of
defendant's offer to surrender, as defendant's failure to reply did not create a
presumption that he had agreed to the reletting. Landon, J., dissenting.
Where a tenant abandons premises during his term, without fault on thepart of the landlord, the tenant is liable for the rent, but the landlord must
relet the premises if possible (12 Am. &- Eng. Enc. 751). It is hard to see,therefore, why the landlord's reletting of the premises in his own name dis-
charged the defendant (Locnow v. Hargan, 58 N. Y. 635).
LIBEL AND SLANDER-SUBSEQUENT CONDUCT-ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE-
MATHEWS V. DETROIT jOURNAL Co., 82 N. W. 243 (Mich.).-In an action, in
charging that plaintiff and another were found together in a compromising
position, where the evidence showed this, and earlier acts of intimacy. Held,
that evidence of subsequent improper actions of the two together was admis-
sible.
The general rule against the admission of proof of subsequent similar actsto prove commission of an act by defendant in criminal cases, is, it is said,
somewhat relaxed where the offense consists of illicit intercourse between the
sexes. Aim. & -Eng. Ency. of Law t2d ed.) 1-753 and4. Evidence of subsequentimproper familiarity is held admissible. Thayer v. Tluayer, rot Mass. iii;Crane v. Peopble, 48N. E. 54, 169, Ill. 395; State v. Bridgenan, 49 Vt. 202,
24 Am. Rep. 124; Contra, State v. Donovan, 61 Iowa 278; Peoflpe v. Fowler,62 N. W. 572, 104 Mich. 449; Corn. v. Pierce, iI Grey. 447.
LIFE INSURANE-APPLICATION-FALSE STATEMENTS-POLICY 
-VALIDITY-
STERNAMAN V. METROPOLITAN LIEE INS. Co., 63 N. Y. Supp. 674.-This was an
action to recover the amount due on a policy issued in reliance on a statement
contained in the application, and warranted true, which was in fact false, and
which was written therein, by the medical examiner of the company, who
knew of its falsity and who by the terms of the application was made the
agent of the insured party. Held, the policy was void. Spring, J., dissent-
ing.
That knowledge by the insured that his statements were false renders thepolicy void, is undisputed. Clements,v. Indemniy Co., 5i N. Y. Supp. 442;
also, that an insurance company may require that the person conducting the
examination be considered as the agent of the insured and not of the insurer,is well sustained by authority. Bernardv. Association, 43 N. Y. Supp. 527.But it has also been held that such stipulations cannot change the facts, and
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that where a duly appointed agent of the company acts in its behalf, withinthe scope of his authority, as otherwise determined, his acts shall be binding
on the company. Whited v. Germania, etc., Ins. Co., 76 N. Y. 415. This lat-
ter rule seems much more equitable.
MASTER AND SERVANT-FELLOW SERVANT'S NEGLIGENCE-GENERAL REPUTA-
TION-KNOWLEDGE OF MASTER-LAMBRECHT V. PFIZER, 63 N. Y. Supp. 59I.-
A fellow-servant, with a general reputation for incompetency, negligently
pushed a truck into a shaft and thereby caused injury to the plaintiff, who was
on a platform elevator below. Held, master not liable.
The court held that the general reputation for incompetency of a servant
among his fellow servants was not sufficient to charge the employer withknowledge of the same without proof of specific cases of negligence, in which
respect he plaintiff failed to establish his case. Park v. Railroad Co., 155
N. V. 215. It has been held, however, that ignorance of incompetency tendsto show negligence on the part of the master and he is liable accordingly. 12Am. &- Enif Ency. 912. Cooley, J., seems to favorthis idea in Davis v.Detroit R. 2. Co., 20 Mich. 124.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO SERVANT-INsTRUcrIONs-RIBICH V.LAKE SUPERIOR SMELTING CO., 82 N. W. 279 (Mich.).-An employee was in-jured by the explosion of a pot of molten copper which he dumped at a place
where there was water. Held, that an instruction that it was the duty of the
master to warn plaintiff that ad explosion might result from contact with
water, and of the "nature, force, and probable effects" of such explosion, was
not erroneous as imposing upon the master the duty of foretelling the precise
result of any possible explosion. The master is not discharged by informing
servant generally that the service is dangerous. Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law(ist ed.) 14-897. The master should inform servant of dangers likely to result
from explosion from contact of hot metal with water. McGowan v. La
Plata Mining and Smelting Co., 3 McCrary's Rep. (393). See note to Farmer
v. Ant. Iowa R. R. Co., 24 N. W. 895.
MARITIME TORTS-DEATH FROM NEGLIGENCE-LAw APPLIcABLE-RUNDELL
V. LA CAMPAGNIE, Ioo Fed. 655.-Plaintiff's intestate met his death at sea in the
collision of the La Bourgogne. Negligence was alleged and damages asked
for. Held, in absence of allegation that death occurred on the ship flying
the French flag, the tort must be held to have been committed on the high
seas, to which the local French law is unapplicable and the general maritime
law, which gives no action for death by negligence, applies.
This we deem to be a good interpretation of a bad law. Congress shouldfill the gap in the maritime law that Lord Campell's Act did for the common
law.
MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS-SEPARATION-VALIDITy-iNG V. MOLLOHAN ET
AL., 60 Pac. Rep. 731 (Kan.).-Where husband and wife by mutual agreement
separated and made mutual conveyances in consideration thereof. Held, such
conveyances valid in law.
The disposition of courts to regard the intention of contracting parties
and their reluctancy to permit the marriage status to be disturbed by agree-
ment of the parties have led to fine distinctions among the authorities, SirWilliam Scott in Mfortimer v Mortimer, 2 Hagg. Cons. 318, holding no agree-
ment binding between married persons in consideration of separation; alsoParsou's Coutr., p 358, but an agreement to make a settlementfor support dur-ing such separation is upheld. Wilson v. Wilson, 3 B. & Ad. 743; Dutton v.Dutton, 30 Ind. 452. But an executory agreement to this effect before separa-tion has taken place will not be enforced. Walker v. Walker, 9 Wall 743.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS- NEGLIGENCE - EXCAVATIONS - GAS - DEATH -
QUESTIONS FOR JURY-CORBIN V. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, 45 Atl. Rep. 1070.
(Penn.).-Where death of plaintiff's son was caused by gas at the bottom of a
trench on defendant's street, while attempting to rescue another who had
been overcome by the gas, and there was evidence that the other revived and
came up unaided from the bottom of the trench, and that those who went
down after the deceased came up uninjured. Held, that the question whether
the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence was for the jury. Linne-
han v. Samfison, 126 Mass. 5o6.
The law has so great regard for human life that it will not impute negli-
gence to an effort to preserve it, if the effort is made with a reasonable regard
for the rescuer's own safety. Eckert v. .Raiload Co., 115 N. Y. 22.
Mitchell J., Green C. J., Fell J., dissenting. That there is no well
recognized principle of law to sustain the results arrived at, only an admira-
tion for heroism, which has no proper place in the administration of justice.
NEWS AGENCIES-MONOPOLIES-INTE-OCEAN PUBLISHING CO. v. ASSOCIATED
PRESS, 56 N. E. 822 (Ill.).-This is a petition for an injunction to preyent the
appellee from expelling appellant from membership in the Associated Press
Publishing Co, for an alleged violation of one of its by-laws forbidding a
member from publishing any news not obtained from, or with the consent of
the association. Held, a provision in the by-laws of a corporation organized
to gather and sell news to newspapers, and in the contract with the publisher
of a newspaper, that one receiving news from it shall not receive news from
any other corporation, which its directors shall declare antagonistic to it, is
void, as creating a monoply.
If this decision is followed by other courts it must surely have consider-
able effect, since it makes news agencies, and other companies of a like nature,
quasi-public corporations, and as such, subject to the laws governing them,
one of which is the prohibition of monopolies injurious to the public. See
Comment.
OIL AND GAS LEASES-CoNDITION PRECEDENT-FORFEITURE-HUGGINS V.
DALEY, 99 Fed. Rep. 6o6.-Where a lease was given to bore and work gas and
oil wells on leasor's land, the consideration being one dollar and a royalty on the
products obtained, with a forfeiture clause stipulating for the payment of $50
in case of failure to bore a well within ninety days, it was held that the fail-
ure to comply by completing a well in ninety days made the lease voidable,
this being a condition precedent and the whole consideration.
Such leases are construed against the grantee. Oil Co. v. Fretts, 152
Penn. St. 451, where the whole consideration is the performance, this makes
it a condition precedent. New Orleans v. Texas &- P. R. R., 171 U. S. 334.
and such condition was not relieved by the provision to forfeit $5o for failure
to comply. Such a lease vests no present title until the condition has been
fulfilled, and failure to explore made the lease a nudum pactum.
RAILROADS--WRONGFUL EJECTMeNT OF PASSENGER-DAMAGES--BADER V.
SOU. PAC. CO., 27 South. Rep. 584 (La.)-Where plaintiff had paid the fare to
his destination, but was erroneously evicted some distance before reaching
his destination, and proceeded to walk there instead of taking the next train,
and was injured. Held, no recovery.
The doctrine that one injured by the careless or willful act of another,
must use ordinary care to keep the damages to.the smallest amount is car-
ried, in the present case, to the extent of holding, that if one have money to
ride, but walks, and is injured, such care is not exercised. Beers v. Board,
35 La Ann. 1132; Sfiry v. RY. Co., 73 Mo. App. 203.
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RECENT CASES.
RECEIVERs-BONDS-LABILITY OF SUEETY-GoOD FAITH-LESrEx v. LAW-
YERS' SURETY Co., 63 N. Y. Sup. 804 (App. Div.).-An action, based on a
receiver's disobedience of an order of the appellate court requiring him to pay
out money, was brought against the surety on the receiver's bond. Held,
that the defendant may show excuse for the apparent disobedience. Van
Brunt, P. J., and McLaughlin, J., dissenting.
When a receiver disobeys an order of court, his surety cannot be held
liable unless by express terms to such orders he is brought" himself into pri-
vity with his principal. Thompson v. McGregor, 81 N. Y. 592; Douglass v.
Howland, 24 Wend. 25. The surety escaped by showing that previous to the
order of the Appellate Court the receiver had paid the money in pursuance of
an order of the trial court, which the Appellate Court reversed. Lovett v.
Ger. Ref. Church, 12 Barb. 67; Simpfson v. Hornbeck, 3 Lans. 53. Whether
or not said payment was made in good faith is a question for the jury.
SLANDER-PROVINCE OF TURY-FRIEDBURG v. NUDD, 60 Pac. Rep. (Kan.)
476.-Held, in an action for slander, that the province of the jury extends not
only to determining the language used, but also to construing what it means,
and instruction is error to the effect that if the jury find certain words were
used, then they must find slander therefrom. The entire question is held one
of fact. Royce v. Maloney, 5 AUt. (Vt.) 395; Riddell v. Thayer, 127 Mass. 487;
Vanderlifi v. Roe, 23 Pa. St. 84. But this doctrine is qualified, Judge Starrett
dissenting, in Ry. Co. v. McCurdy, 8 AUt. (Pa.) 230.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONs-BuRDEN OF PROoF-GuPToN v. HAWKIns, 35 S.
E. 229 (N. C.).-Where in an action on a bond the statute of limitations was
pleaded as a defense. Held, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove
that the statute has not run. Grant v. Burgwyn, 84 N. C. 560; Brice v.
Brice, 2 Ind. 87.
STATUTES OF LIMITATION-WHICH GOVERNS- STATUTORY LiAEITrzs-
BR NswICK TERM. Co. v. NAT. BANK OF BALTIMoRE, 99 Fed. Rep. 635.-Held,
in an action brought in Maryland v. defendant bank as a stockholder in an
insolvent Georgia bank on a liability created by statute, the Georgia statute of
limitations and not the Maryland one governs. Brawley, J., dissenting. The
general rule is that the lex fori controls the remedy, and the statute of limitations
pertains to the remedy. The statute of the State, therefore, in which the action
is brought applies. But where the liability is purely a statutory one, it appar-
ently forms an exception to the rule. The Harrisburg, xx9 U. S. i9q; Flash
v. Conn., 109 U. S. 371; Fennell v. Southern Kas. R. R., 33 Fed. Rep. 427,
seems to indicate this. It is clear that no action can be maintained anywhere
on such a liability when the statute has run against it in the State giving it.
Krogg v. A. & W. P. R. R., 77 Ga. o2; Eastwood v. Kennedy, 44 Md. 563;
Halsey v. McLean, 12 Allen (Mass.) 439; P. R. R. v. Hine, 25 Ohio St. 629.
So it seems only fair, as this case holds, to compensate for this restriction by
allowing the action to be maintained till it is barred in the State creating it.
TRADE-MARK - COPORATE N z-ExcLusvE RIGHT-HYGEIA DISTILLED
WATER Co. v. HVGEIA ICE Co., 45 Atlan. 957 (Conn.). -The plaintiff had
adopted the word" Hygeia" as a trade-mark to designate its product of dis-
tilled water and beverages made therefrom. The defendant adopted the same
word to designate its products and was sued by the plaintiff for infringement.
Held, that the defendant could be enjoined.
This case is peculiar, in tha tthe word "Hygeia" permits of two separate
and distinct meanings. The word originally was used as the name of a mytho-
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logical person. Later on it was adopted as a term synonsmnus with health.
Under this latter signification, as indicative of quality, the decisions of numer-
ous cases would clearly have given the defendant the right to use the term.
Russia Cement Co. v. Le Page, 47 Mass. 211; Ginter v. Kinney Tobacco Co.,
12 Fed. Rep. 782. . The facts brought out by the evidence, however, showed
that the plaintiff had adopted it under its original meaning, and thus it could
be used as a trade-mark. Edmonds v. Benhow, Seton (4th ed.) 238; Barrows
v. Knight, 6 R. I. 434.
TRU;T DEED-ATTORNEY'S FzES-TURNER v. BAGER, 35 S. E. 592 (N. C.)-A
provision in a deed of trust that a fee of 5 % should be paid for the services of
an attorney in case of foreclosure. Held, to be invalid as against public policy.
We have failed to find any direct support for this decision, but the
doctrine of a long line of decisions respecting the invalidity of provisions for
fees, in the collection of promissory notes and kindred matters seems to have
been slightly extended by the present case to embrace the facts involved.
Bullard v. Taylor, 39 Mich. i37; Bank v. Sevier. 14 Fed. Rep. 662.
VENDOR'S LIEN-WAIVER-CHASTAINV. HAINES, 27 Sou. Rep. 510 (Ala.).-
Where complainant sold land, the purchase money of which was all paid save
$89.oo, and he refused to execute a conveyance until the balance was paid,
which amount, however, was disputed, and the parties formally agreed to
abide by the decision of arbitrators chosen. Held, that when the arbitra-
tors decided the amount due to be $5.20 and ordered it paid in seven months
and an immediate conveyance to be made by the other party, a failure of the
vendee to pay the $5.20 when agreed revives the vendor's lien for the $89.oo
It seems rather strange that after a proper award by arbitrators that a
lien for original purchase money should revive; but the present case holds that
the foregoing facts are not sufficient to remove the presumption existing in
favor of the retention by the vendor of his equitable lien for unpaid purchase
money. Pam. E7. fur. 125o. Thomfison v. Shefifiard, 85 Ala. 6ix.
VOID BONDS-STATUTE LEGALIZING-RETROACTiVE EFFEcr-N. Y. LIFE
INS. Co. v. CoMIssIoNzaS, 99 Fed. Rep. 846.-A county issued bonds to build
an armory, under a statute subsequently adjudged void. The Legislature
then passed a statute legalizing the bonds, and giving the bondholders an
action against the county for their value.
Held, such statute was unconstitutional as creating a new right rather
than a new remedy, and was repugnant to the clause in the Ohio Constitution
against retroactive laws. Whre the natural justice of it is clear, it seems the
legislature has such power. Board of Education v. State, 51 Ohio 531. But it
was considered that here the juster remedy would be to recover against the
property itself.
VOID MuNcIPAL BoNDs-REovERY IN AssuMPsEr-TRAvELLERS' INs. Co. v.
MAYOR rc., or JoHNsoN CITY, 99 Fed. Rep. 663.-Where a city issued void
bonds to subscribe for stock to construct a railroad and depot, which were sub-
sequently built and the stock delivered and retained, a purchaser of such
negotiable bonds, payable to bearer, could not recover from the city for money
had and received, since the construction of the railroad and depot on the
railroad's own property couferred no such direct benefit as would raise an
implied promise to pay; and the stock retained was void in its hands.
This is held to be the same in principle as the enhancement of one man's
land by improvements made on another's where no promise is raised. R. R.
Co. v. Bensley 664 U.S. App. xs. But where the city receives money or
property into its actual possession, there can generally be a recovery. Read
v. City of Plattsmouth, 107 U. S. 568; Chaiman v. Douglass County, 107 U.-
S. 348; a. v. Wood, xo2 U. S. 294. In Parkersburg v. Brown, io6 U. S.
487, where void bonds were issued to establish a manufacturing plant, the
bondholders to follow the property and proceed in rem.
37-0
